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Introduction
The term environmental fiscal reforms (EFR) refers to a
range of taxation and pricing measures that can raise
fiscal revenues while furthering environmental goals.
Environmental fiscal reform approaches and instruments
complement and strengthen regulatory and othersellschaft f€ur Internationale
Safdarjung Enclave, New
91 11 49495353; fax: þ91 11
e (M.S. Saluja).
ian Institute of Management
4.06.004
anagement Bangalore. Productioapproaches to fiscal and environmental management. By
affecting market prices, EFR can potentially lead to
achievement of environmental objectives much more effi-
ciently and cost-effectively than command-and-control
(CAC) based regulatory measures. Environmental fiscal re-
forms can also contribute to poverty reduction and devel-
opment goals in developing countries. In theory, this may
be achieved in two ways: 1. reducing pollution and
conserving natural resources which helps to sustain liveli-
hoods and fosters wellbeing of the poor, and 2. revenue
generated through EFR which can be used for other pro-
poor measures.
Environmental fiscal reform instruments
The range of EFR instruments is wide and different mea-
sures may be required and be more appropriate for
different countries and sectors. While there could be non and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
194 A. Chaturvedi et al.simple generalization, they fall into the following broad
groups (GIZ, 2013; World Bank, 2005).
Charges and fees
User charges cover the cost of collective services associ-
ated with the treatment or disposal of the pollution asso-
ciated with the consumption or use of a product. User
charges could be in the form of a charge for providing the
energy/water supply or collection of solid waste/waste
water. These charges help create a strong incentive for
resource efficiency and cleaner technologies by discour-
aging emissions, waste generation, and use of environ-
mental resources. On the other hand, social considerations
of charging for services, like water, from very poor house-
holds also need to be taken into account. Due to resultant
political considerations, there is always a concern that it
may lead to charge rates that do not cover the actual costs
of the service provided.
Environmental subsidies
Government institutions provide direct or indirect financial
support to promote resource efficient and cleaner produc-
tion and services. This is used as a tool to promote inno-
vation, or to facilitate adaptation to new legal frameworks
or to preserve environmentally sound structures and pro-
duction processes. Such subsidies are a potent instrument
to influence investment and purchase behaviours in a very
short period of time. On the other hand, they do tend to
strain public budgets and interfere with normal market
development processes.
Governments also provide substantial subsidies on energy
and natural resources to keep such vital resources/services
affordable. However, such underpricing leads to wasteful
use leading to resource depletion and environmental
degradation, besides imposing significant fiscal pressures on
government. Since such broad subsidisation typically bene-
fits the non-poor disproportionately, it could be considered
doubly wasteful. Reduction or elimination of such subsidies
thus provides multiple benefits: resource conservation,
environmental improvement, reduced government deficits,
and reduction of market distortions in the economy. Tar-
getted compensation schemes are frequently used when
subsidies are reduced to alleviate hardship of negatively
affected parties, especially low income households.
Taxes on products, pollutants, and emissions
Charges are levied on products directly or based on the units
of harmful substances contained in them. Taxes could also be
related to themeasurement of pollutant discharges. Product
taxes are usually effective when the objective is to reduce
the usage of the product. Relocating activities to places
outside the regulated area remains probably the most
frequent evasive action taken, leading to economic losses
and undermining environmental improvement.
There are certain key principles that EFR design needs to
follow. The practical aspects for setting the level of taxes
should help establish the principle that industries should
pay for pollution and invest in clean technology. Revenues
from EFR allocated to environmental purposes must be
managed in line with principles of sound public expendi-
tures management, fiscal discipline, efficient allocation of
public funds, operational efficiency, accountability, andtransparency. Revenues generated through EFR are also
often used to reduce other distortionary/undesirable taxes
in the economy and/or compensate negatively affected
parties in order to gain public support. Environmental fiscal
reform instruments should be developed within the context
of existing regulatory and institutional frameworks and
their scope should match the institutional capacity to
implement and monitor.
International experience with environmental fiscal
reform
European Union (EU) countries have the longest experience
with EFR, with the Nordic countries among the first to
implement EFR in the early 1990s followed by countries
such as Germany, UK, France, and Italy in the late 1990s
(OECD, 2001). Today the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD) lists 375 such taxes in
OECD member countries plus some 250 other environmen-
tally related charges and fees with revenue from environ-
mentally related taxes averaging roughly 2% of GDP and 6%
of total tax revenue in countries involved (OECD, 2010). In
many countries, revenues gained from environmentally
related taxes have been used to decrease the overall tax
burden to achieve (at least partial) revenue-neutrality.
Most eco-taxes are directed towards energy, transport,
and carbon or CO2 with the revenues coming from such
taxes dwarfing those from other sectors such as water,
waste, pollutant discharges, etc. (OECD, 2010). Environ-
mental fiscal reform measures in different sectors in
selected OECD countries along with, in some cases, their
impacts are summarized below:
Carbon or CO2 taxes
Denmark, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and
Sweden have levies named “carbon taxes” or “CO2 taxes”
that, at least partially, reflect the varying carbon content
of different fuels (OECD, 2006). However, various exemp-
tions and rebates have been introduced due to concerns
about sectoral competitiveness including for electricity
generation, aviation fuel, and production of cement. The
Danish Environmental Protection Agency estimates that CO2
emissions were reduced by 24% between 1990 and 2001 due
to the carbon tax compared to business-as-usual (Cottrell,
Mander, Schmidt, & Schlegelmilch, 2010). In Norway, the
impact of carbon taxes has been estimated to be a 2% CO2
emission reduction between 1990 and 1999 (Bruvoll &
Larsen, 2004). Studies by the Federal Environment Agency
in Germany show that CO2 emissions have been reduced
2e5% by 2005 due to ecological tax reform (UBA, 2004). The
Swedish carbon tax is estimated to have reduced CO2
emissions by 9% between 1990 and 2007 (Cottrell et al.,
2010). The UK Climate Change Levy taxes energy deliv-
ered, except that derived from renewable, but exempts the
household and transportation sectors. According to an
analysis by Cambridge Econometrics (2005), the levy led to
a 2% reduction in CO2 emissions in the UK by 2002.
Electricity taxes
About half of OECD member countries apply taxes on
electricity consumption per kWh rather than on the fuels
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a tax of 4.9% of the price on production and import on
electricity (OECD, 2006). Sweden imposes additional taxes
on nuclear energy to address the unique issue of nuclear
waste. Tax rates vary by country and often by sector as
well, with energy intensive manufacturing sectors typically
enjoying exemptions and rebates due to competitiveness
concerns. In the UK, the household sector is completely
exempt from the electricity tax (OECD, 2006). An elec-
tricity tax encourages energy savings but may not promote
switching to cleaner fuels.
Transportation fuel taxes
Excise taxes on motor fuel have been around for many years
but explicit environmental taxes are relatively new.
Magnitude of motor fuel taxes vary greatly by region with
lowest levels in North America, intermediate levels in OECD
countries in the AsiaePacific and the highest in Europe,
where in some cases the tax exceeds 100% of the pre-tax
fuel price. In most countries, diesel is taxed at a lower rate
than petrol with a few notable exceptions: Switzerland and
the US tax diesel higher than petrol, New Zealand does not
tax diesel, and both fuels are taxed at the same rate in
Australia and the UK (OECD, 2010). For almost all countries
tax levels on both fuels increased gradually over the past
decade, though not necessarily in real terms. Turkey and
Greece witnessed significant increases, with budgetary
crisis being the main driver in the latter case, while Mexico
is the only OECD country to have decreased tax levels due
to sudden spikes in international oil prices after 2008
(OECD, 2010). The clearest sign of effectiveness of the
petrol tax comes from Europe where petrol use peaked in
1999 and a 10% reduction was seen by 2004. However,
petrol to diesel switching was significant (OECD, 2006). The
fuel duty escalator (FDE) was introduced in the UK in 1993
at 3% which was bumped up to 6% by 1999 with concomitant
cuts in income taxes. However, the impact of oil price rises,
much of it unrelated, led to widespread protests and the
FDE was discontinued in 2000 (Cottrell et al., 2010). Public
transportation enjoys fuel tax exemptions/rebates or re-
funds in many countries, as does fuel for on-farm machin-
ery/vehicles in some countries. Home heating fuel is
typically taxed at a much lower rate, if at all, compared to
diesel in most countries even though they have similar
environmental impacts; this is due to equity concerns for
low income households.
Motor vehicle taxes
Motor vehicle taxes are of two types: one-off (during initial
sale or import) and recurring (e.g. annual registration
renewal). Between the two categories they can have a sig-
nificant effect on car ownership and the composition of na-
tional fleets. Such taxes are increasingly being converted to a
sliding scale based on attributes like a car’s fuel efficiency,
emissions profile, etc. While for most OECD countries,
recurring vehicle taxes comprise thebigger share of revenue,
the opposite is true for Norway and Denmark, who have very
high levels of initial tax on car purchases (OECD, 2010).
Solid waste
While there are usually a range of policies to reduce and
recover solid waste that act in concert, taxes on landfillingare nearly universal. However, tax rates vary by country or
even within a country based on factors like availability of
land and alternate options; some countries like Denmark
also charge a lower rate for waste disposal facilities that
incorporate energy recovery. Densely populated countries
typically have higher landfill taxes; Austria and the
Netherlands have some of the highest rates among OECD
countries, while rates in most parts of the US are among the
lowest (OECD, 2010). According to an analysis of the landfill
tax by the UK Treasury (2005), the quantity of inert waste
disposed fell 35% between 1997 and 2004. The effectiveness
of a landfill tax is somewhat reduced where options for
waste recovery are limited. Some countries like Norway
also have a tax on waste incineration.
Many countries, particularly in the EU, also impose special
taxes and/or charges on certain consumer products that have
the potential for significant environmental harm. Most EU
countries have special taxes on batteries based on size and
type, with Sweden’s rate being among the highest (OECD,
2006). A number of countries have introduced taxes to
reduce packaging use and packaging waste. For example,
Belgium, Finland, Norway, and Denmark have taxes on
beverage containers with the rate varying, based on factors
such as the material of the container, whether it is refillable,
or part of a return system. A tax onplastic bags in Ireland since
2002 has contributed to a 90% reduction in use (OECD, 2006).
Air pollutants
Sulphur oxides (SOx) and nitrogen oxides (NOx) are the air
pollutants most commonly targetted through taxation
schemes that aim to achieve further emission reductions
beyond what has been achieved through regulatory stra-
tegies. Taxation of NOx requires sophisticated monitoring
capacity due to the nature of NOx formation, limiting its
wide usage. In general, NOx tax rates in OECD countries are
quite low, under EUR 0.20/kg, with the exception of Swe-
den and Norway, while the rate in New South Wales,
Australia is variable depending on time and place to better
reflect environmental harm (OECD, 2010).
The most common way of taxing SOx is to tax the sulphur
content of diesel fuel. Many OECD countries have a gradu-
ated diesel tax based on the sulphur content. The impact of
such a differential tax was quite spectacular in the UK; the
high sulphur variety quickly disappeared from the market
after the tax was introduced. The sulphur-based diesel tax
in Denmark has been estimated to have reduced SO2
emissions by 6550 tonnes in 2000 (OECD, 2006). The
Swedish suphur tax led to the fall in the sulphur content of
motor fuels to more than 50% below the legal standard
(Nordic Council of Ministers, 2002).
Agricultural and industrial chemicals
In most EU countries, pesticides are tightly regulated and
hence relatively few countries use taxation as an added
policy instrument. However, Denmark raised USD 80 million
in 2007 from pesticide taxes. Norway uses an innovative
system where tax rates on pesticides vary based on their
actual environmental harm rather than quantity sold. While
this is administratively challenging, in Norway this is less of
an issue since only 188 pesticides are approved for use
(OECD, 2010). Fertilizers are more widely taxed throughout
the OECD. While the US tax rate is set per ton of product,
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on the amount of nitrogen and phosphate (OECD, 2006).
Chlorinated solvents are among the most common
category of industrial chemicals to be taxed in OECD
countries; some of them being ozone depleting, while
others have different kinds of toxicity. Denmark and Nor-
way have experienced dramatic declines in the use of such
chemicals even though tax revenues collected were quite
low (OECD, 2006).
Environmental fiscal reforms in the Indian context
In India, CAC measures/instruments have traditionally been
used to regulate industrial pollution. India’s pollution control
regime based on the environmental legislations and rules
emanating fromthemmaybecharacterizedas a “prohibit and
punish” regime (Divan & Rosencranz, 2001). In this regime the
penalties for non-compliance with regulations are unrelated
to compliance costs. Enforcement takes the formofeither full
compliance or no compliance; the extent of violations is not
considered by the regulators and the courts.
The National Environmental Policy (NEP), 2006 recognizes
the shortcomings of the CAC regime in which the penalties
are not proportional to the extent of violation from the
standards. It states that “the present environmental mech-
anism is predominantly based on the principles of criminal
liability, which have not proved sufficiently effective, and
need to be supplemented”. It notes that civil law “offers
flexibility, and its sanctions can be more effectively tailored
to particular situations”. The NEP recommends a review of
existing legislation to arrive at a judicious mix of civil and
criminal processes and sanctions. It states that civil liability
law, civil sanctions, and processes should govern most situ-
ations of non-compliance (Sankar, 2009).
Command-and-control instruments work on the principle
of influencing industries through conditions for obtaining
consent to operate, as well as through environmental
standards and restrictions/bans. However, the effective-
ness of this approach has been found to be limited,
particularly in dealing with the micro, small and medium
enterprises (MSMEs) and the unorganized sector, owing to
high number of enterprises, challenges in monitoring their
activities, limited resources with regulators, lack of
awareness of environmental norms and lack of capacity and
incentives for such industries (Chelliah, Appasamy, Sankar,
& Pandey, 2007). The unorganized sector in the country
makes a vast contribution towards the country’s economy
and job market and therefore closure of industries for non-
compliance is not an inclusive or sustainable approach to
the problem. Here, EFR presents a strong case for over-
coming the limitations of CAC instruments through innova-
tive use of instruments for integrating MSMEs and the
unorganized sector into the mainstream.
India, in line with global trends, has witnessed some
activity in the adoption and implementation of EFR. One of
the most newsworthy events was the removal of govern-
ment subsidy for petrol in 2010 paving the way for market-
based pricing. It has been conclusively established that the
petrol subsidy was only benefitting the well off since petrol
is mainly used for passenger cars, so the government’s
significant fiscal burden was not serving any social purpose.
This step encountered relatively little public outcry, butthe full removal of fuel subsidies on diesel, LPG, and
kerosene are likely to have much wider implications and are
therefore still under discussion (Anand, Coady, Mohommad,
Thakoor, & Walsh, 2013).
The National Clean Energy Fund (NCEF) instituted in
2010e2011, by levying a clean energy cess on coal produced
in India and imported coal at a nominal rate of Rs. 50 per
ton, is seen as a major step in India’s quest for energy se-
curity and reducing carbon intensity of energy. The NCEF
was created for funding research and innovative projects in
clean energy technologies. But, it has been observed that
utilisation of funds from NCEF, which has accumulated
more than INR 8200 crores, has been rather low and dis-
bursements, so far, are aligned more with on-going pro-
grammes/missions of various ministries/departments than
with the stated objectives of the fund. Many opportunities
exist in improving efficiency and addressing climate change
concerns. Development and adaptation of technologies for
mining low ash coal and efficient coal handling has huge
potential. Coal beneficiation improves its thermal effi-
ciency and reduces operation and transport costs of power
plants and other users. Coal bed methane and underground
coal gasification are other areas which would need support
with technology adaptation (Pandey, Bali, & Mongia, 2013).
Another important example is the Ministry of Environ-
ment and Forests’ long-running subsidy for common
effluent treatment plants (CETPs), which is helping small
scale industries in industrial clusters across the country to
manage their wastewater more cost-effectively. In 1991,
the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) initiated an
innovative financial support scheme for CETPs to promote
common facilities for treatment of effluents generated
from small scale industrial (SSI) units located in clusters.
Under this scheme, the contribution from central and state
governments was 50% of the capital cost, with 25% each
from central and state governments. The above scheme
was revised in 2012 in light of operational deficiencies in
the earlier scheme, the development of pollution control
technologies over the years, financial constraints on the
part of SSI proponents, and recommendations of the State
Pollution Control Boards (SPCBs) related thereto. As per the
revised scheme, the central assistance is now 50% and the
state assistance is 25%, with the proponent bearing only
25%. For CETPs involving primary/secondary/tertiary
treatment, financial assistance would be provided by the
Government of India to the tune of 50% of maximum INR
1.50 crore/MLD (million litres per day) capacity, subject to
a ceiling of central assistance of INR 15 crores per CETP. For
CETPs involving primary/secondary/tertiary treatment and
ZLD (zero liquid discharge) treatment, financial assistance
would be provided by MoEF to the tune of 50% of maximum
INR 4.50 crores/MLD capacity, subject to a ceiling of central
assistance of INR 20 crores per CETP (MoEF, 2011).
There have been a number of market based instruments
(MBIs) introduced recently in the field of energy policy which
do have an important indirect impact on environmental
policy. In order to increase energy efficiency uptake in in-
dustries in a cost-effective manner, the Bureau of Energy
Efficiency (BEE) has launched a market based mechanism
called the Perform, Achieve, and Trade (PAT) programme in
2012. The PAT mechanism entails targets in terms of specific
energy consumption for covered industries, across eight
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through energy efficiency programmes or through purchase
of energy saving certificates from other industries which
have exceeded their targets. The programme covers facil-
ities that account for more than 50% of the fossil fuel used in
India and will help to reduce CO2 emissions by 25million tons
per year by 2014e15 (EDF & IETA, 2014). Another market
based mechanism that has been introduced in India is the
trading of Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs) coupled
with Renewable PurchaseObligations (RPO). Themechanism
calls for renewable energy targets for utilities, captive
power producers, and open access consumers. These targets
can bemet through renewable energy generation, or through
purchase of RECs from other generators (EDF & IETA, 2014).
Based on these recent developments, the Ministry of Envi-
ronment and Forests (MoEF) and the Central Pollution Con-
trol Board (CPCB) have also envisaged an Emission Trading
Scheme (ETS) to target local pollutants such as SOx, NOx, and
suspended particulate matter (EDF & IETA, 2014). Currently,
pilot projects are scheduled to be undertaken in three
states, namely Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, and Maharashtra.
However, the complexity of creating and implementing an
ETS, which requires extensive and accurate baseline data
and monitoring, means that it needs to be approached
carefully and methodically, building upon regulatory expe-
rience with other MBIs.
However, even though EFRs are being accepted in India
as an effective option for tackling industrial pollution, the
scale of adoption of EFR needs to be augmented and
innovative solutions are required to bring about trans-
formational change, as opposed to isolated success stories.
Lessons for India from international experience
While studies have almost universally shown that EFR, when
properly designed and implemented, can meet environ-
mental goals with net positive impacts on the economy in
terms of GDP, government revenues, and employment
(Ekins, 2009; Green Fiscal Commission, 2009; NERI et al.,
2007), the reality has been somewhat more complex.
Concerns about sectoral competitiveness have been wide-
spread in OECD countries, leading to substantial or even
total tax exemptions to sectors like industry and agricul-
ture. Further, concerns about energy prices hurting ordi-
nary consumers have led to significant opposition to energy
related taxes, as seen in the UK FDE cancellation. Such
lessons from OECD countries need to be combined with
considerations peculiar to developing countries when
designing EFR strategies in India.
For developing countries like India, EFR has the added
attraction of contributing to poverty reduction and devel-
opment goals. Several developing countries have experi-
mented with EFR with varying degrees of success. Perhaps
the best known EFR programme in the developing world is
China’s Pollution Levy System, among the most extensive in
the world. While the system has its imperfections e fees
are levied only for non-compliance and much of the reve-
nue collected is used to finance abatement costs for in-
dustry e and enforcement has been uneven due to political
and public pressure, it has been expanded and amended
over time and is widely considered to play an important
role in containing pollution in China (OECD, 2005).However, EFR in developing countries usually tend to be
sporadic and examples of comprehensive policies that
integrate environmental management with broader devel-
opment goals are rare. Factors that explain the current
underutilization of economic instruments include a lack of
understanding of how such instruments work and their
benefits, inadequate legal/institutional capacity, political
opposition to increased costs both from industry and the
public, and preference for the status quo, which typically is
built around CAC frameworks (UNEP, 2004). In spite of the
potential cost savings of MBIs over CAC measures, there are
still a number of other considerations that affect the choice
of policy instruments. These include the framework of
environmental laws already in place, the technical capa-
bility and the costs to government ministries to administer
market-based programmes, and the political feasibility of
MBIs in terms of the acceptability of the distribution of
benefits, costs, and risks associated with the instruments.
In developing countries, the biggest obstacle to EFR arises
when the reforms appear to be in conflict with poverty
reduction goals. Reforms of subsidies and user charges are
areas that can have a negative impact on the poor, most
commonly when they lead to higher energy prices. But it is
possible to soften undesirable distributional impacts through
carefully designed instruments as well as supplementary
policies targetted at the poor. In recognition of these trade-
offs, EFR should be viewed as part of a comprehensive set of
policies aimed at achieving economic and environmental
goals. Lessons from EFR implementation in both developed
and developing countries have provided some critical insights
into factors that determine success (World Bank, 2005). First
of all, a thorough understanding of the political economy of
EFR is required, that covers legal and institutional frame-
works, political situation, and economic conditions. Any EFR
being conceptualized needs to be tailored to the specific po-
litical and economic context of the country in question and it
has to be decided whether EFR is the best course of action to
achieve desired goals. A rigorous analysis of instrument
choice, design, and policy impacts, both positive and nega-
tive, has to be conducted to determine the optimal outcome.
Next,wide ranging stakeholder consultations are necessary to
understand their perspectives and allay their concerns,
togetherwithaneffectivepublicawareness campaign tobuild
political support. Before implementation begins, institutional
capacity building and necessary reforms need to be put in
place to ensure successful implementation. Ideally, EFR is
integrated intoabroaderpolicy framework andcompensatory
mechanisms, if any, are simultaneously put in place. Typi-
cally, reforms are announcedwell in advance to help affected
groups prepare, and big reforms are phased in gradually over
time tominimizedisruption. A key issue is often the end use of
additional revenues generated and a fair and transparent
mechanism for utilization of said revenues is vital to public
acceptance. Finally, a well-developed monitoring and evalu-
ation system needs to be put in place to detect problems,
foster continuous improvement, and sustain public support.
The importance of understanding the political economy and
building political support is demonstrated by several recent
examples from developing countries. When the government
of Ghana tried to raise electricity prices in 1997, it was met
with an uproar andhad tobe rolledback.However, soon after,
a Public Utilities Regulatory Commission was established and
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198 A. Chaturvedi et al.after a series of public consultations and media campaigns,
the same increase was passed within a year with little
resistance. The key was to persuade consumers that the
revenues generated by the price rise would be used to
increase access to electricity for the poor (World Bank, 2005).
A second instance was when fuel price rises led to riots
in Indonesia in 1998. In 2005, the Indonesian government
went to considerable lengths to publicize and implement a
targetted cash transfer programme to compensate the poor
for fuel price increases; as a result of which there was no
major public protest when fuel prices increased (World Bank,
2005).
In India, removal of diesel subsidies is undoubtedly the
most controversial topic in the realm of EFR. Since India is
heavily dependent on imports of petroleum based products,
the Indian government has been losing close to 2% of GDP
for fuel subsidies in valuable foreign currency each year
(Anand et al., 2013). While numerous studies have shown
that most of the subsidies end up benefitting the non-poor
(eg. private car owners), political opposition to removal of
fuel subsidies remains high due to widespread concerns
that diesel price rises will have a cascading inflationary
effect on food and other essential goods. But recent
experience in several developing countries like Brazil,
Philippines, and Turkey has shown that a phased removal of
fuel subsidies is possible with compensatory cash transfers
targetted to poor households (Anand et al., 2013). The In-
dian government needs to gradually build support for a
similar programme carefully designed with the Indian
context in mind. In terms of environmental taxes, admin-
istrative capacity for implementation is as important as
political support. For taxes on products like motor vehicles,
motor fuel or electricity, the existing tax collection mech-
anism is already robust and any imposition of an additional
“environmental” tax is largely dependent on political sup-
port. On the other hand, for taxing pollutants (air, water, or
waste), elaborate monitoring mechanisms have to be first
put in place, with both technology and manpower di-
mensions factored in with the current system being too
rudimentary for the purpose. In addition to creating
administrative capacity, the government can take several
steps to increase acceptance of pollution taxes by industry:
the government can serve as a knowledge resource for
clean technology, it can provide financial and/or regulatory
incentives for installing clean technology, and it can even
allow partial cost-sharing from the eco-tax revenue
generated for pollution abatement cost incurred by in-
dustry, as in the Chinese example described above. Finally,
the US and Europe experience has shown that emissions
trading schemes are highly complicated to implement, and
its success in India is quite unlikely without regulators first
having gained some experience in relatively simpler eco-
nomic instruments like pollution taxes and charges.
A final important consideration is the investment, rev-
enue, and finance component. As noted in the previous
paragraph, substantial investments in both manpower and
technological capacity are needed in India before EFR can
be implemented, the most obvious being continuous emis-
sions monitoring systems for industrial pollution. Ideally,
additional allocation of public investment may not be
necessary if EFR is extensively deployed, since part of the
revenues generated through EFR schemes can be used forthis purpose, as is the case in many countries including
China. The government can also use part of the revenues to
help mitigate pollution abatement costs by industry by
subsidizing import/installation costs of clean technology or
through equivalent financial incentives. This strategy is also
widely used in other countries and has proved vital for
gaining support from industry for EFR. Some revenue can be
allocated to environmental R&D with broader and more
long-term benefits to the country. Finally, part of the rev-
enue should be used for compensatory measures targetting
poor households likely to be negatively affected by energy
price inflation caused by EFR; this is almost a requirement
for public acceptance as the experience in other developing
countries has shown. Since India is in the process of
currently rolling out targetted cash transfer schemes for
poverty alleviation, this is an ideal opportunity to integrate
the EFR-based cash transfer to the broader scheme to
maximize synergy.
Conclusion
It may safely be concluded that there is ample scope for
further taxation and application of fiscal instruments for
environmental services in India. The fiscal, environmental,
and poverty reduction benefits of EFR go hand in hand, but
there may be tradeoffs between various objectives and they
must be addressed explicitly. Apart from the issues of equity,
environmental effectiveness, and administrative feasibility,
the dimension of political economy is also critical in the
policy design of EFR, and building political support through
stakeholder engagement is crucial to its success. Recent
spikes in oil prices worldwide combined with prolonged
economic recession have reduced enthusiasm for green
taxes, even in progressive regions like Europe. While, EFR
continue to expand in OECD countries and beyond, policy
makers have to be extra sensitive to economic impacts, real
or perceived, going forward. Some degree of EFR harmoni-
zation at the international level is perhaps the only way to
address competitiveness concerns in the long term.Environmental fiscal reforms e panel
discussion
Environmental fiscal reforms 199Ashish Chaturvedi: Welcome to this discussion on the
effectiveness of environmental fiscal reforms (EFR). Our
panel consists of some of the leading researchers in India
who have been working in this area over the last 10e15
years. I will first lay out the basics of EFR and then our
panellists will make their individual presentations.
Environmental fiscal reforms refer to a specific class or
range of fiscal instruments that can raise revenues while
simultaneously furthering environmental goals (World
Bank, 2005). This can lead to a range of economic, social
and environmental benefits. The benefits include
 Investments/Targetted generation of resources
 Revenue mobilization, reduction in distortions and
reduced drain on public finances
 Expanded markets for innovative and increasingly green
technologies and environment friendly consumer
products
 Poverty alleviation by addressing environmental prob-
lems that affect the poor, improved access to envi-
ronmental infrastructure and efficient financing
mechanisms for the poor
 Incentives for sustainable natural resource manage-
ment and curbing environmental pollution
There are various ways of doing waste management.
However, if you introduce user charges, you would simul-
taneously raise revenue for waste management e that
would be one kind of fiscal instrument. Otherwise, waste
management could run down the revenues of the munici-
pality and the municipality could go bankrupt! I am sure
some of our panellists will actually talk about ways to raise
revenue and cut down taxes simultaneously. For instance
you could have an eco tax where you are putting a tax on
carbon and at the same time you are reducing labour taxes.
Following is a list of some of the instruments of EFR
 Taxes on extraction of renewable resources such as
fisheries and forests and/or exhaustible resources
 Cost recovery and pricing measures for services e
water, electricity, waste management, etc.
 Taxes on industrial pollution and waste
 Taxes for fuel consumption to reduce pollution load
inventory
 Pricing of natural resources and select publicly provided
services, as the deviation of prices from the marginal
cost of supply of the public services may be viewed as
the tax or subsidy impacting the government budget
There is a huge debate going on around mining in India
and in this context, one of the biggest gaps right now is that
we do not have a clear cut regime. At the heart of the
entire discussion is the pricing of natural resources e
renewable and non-renewable, which is exhaustive in some
cases and not exhaustive in others. In the pricing of natural
resources, you may be aware of the work being done by The
Economics of Ecosystem and Biodiversity (TEEB) and the UN
Environment Programme (UNEP).
What are the key challenges that we are facing in India
with regard to environmental and resource use manage-
ment, and why do we need the economic instruments? Oneof the major challenges is that sectoral policies do not
internalize the environmental costs that have contributed
to environmental stress in India. Does industrial activity
internalize the environmental pollution that it is going to
cause? Does the price of an electrical product internalize
the cost of the environmental damage that the product
might cause when it is being disposed of?
We have a regime of subsidies e explicit and implicit e
in agriculture, energy, water, and so on. While we need
subsidies to meet certain social objectives, how are they
being implemented? How are they being targetted? Have
they created environmental externalities and economic
distortions e (for example e targetted subsidies being
enjoyed by different class of people, black markets, etc)?
There are several challenges when it comes to subsidizing
natural resources.
There is the issue of co-ordination among stakeholders.
The stakeholders include the ministries such as the envi-
ronment ministry, the mining industry, the agencies which
are at different levels of governance, and so on, and co-
operation between them becomes an issue. So far, our
approach has been mostly been top-down in nature with
limited use of incentive based deterrence.
Further, regulation has its own challenges. There is a
lack of decentralized environmental management, with
poor capacity and accountability of local institutions. If you
take infrastructure, both the state pollution control board
as well as the central pollution control board have capacity
related issues. When you have capacity issues and you still
want to be top down, you are bound to face challenges; you
need people to govern industries and you need to come out
with smart instruments, you have to think about potential
fiscal reforms there as well.
From the perspective of an academic institute, we find
that data is a problem. In India, for most things, you don’t
find the right kind of data for any kind of study that you
want to do. You have to collect the data on your own more
often than not, and there is very limited secondary data
available to you for analysis or even a technical study.
However, I don’t want to end my summary of issues on a
negative note, especially since there are so many exciting
and innovative things happening on the ground and envi-
ronmental concerns are getting more and more main-
stream. I am sure our panellists will talk about them.
Our first speaker is Purnamita Dasgupta, a professor in the
Institute of Economic Growth in Delhi who has done a lot of
work in environmental economics in India. She has done
seminal work on valuation of environmental resources in
India, and is actively engaged in climate change research.
Purnamita Dasgupta: I will first place my thoughts on
where and why I think environmental fiscal reforms fit into
the overall framework of understanding of the environment
and why they are an important instrument in the hands of
economists in particular.
There are various arguments that one can make for
protecting the environment. One is altruism. As individuals
we say that we should all be environmentally conscious and
behave in a particular way and be happy to pay environ-
mental taxes. But we seem to make allowances for industry
and we seem to be quite ready to understand that industry
will not behave in a similar way, because it adds to their
cost. Their abatement cost goes up and if they have to
Figure 1 Instruments and approaches of EFR.
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with cost implications and an impact on their profitability.
In turn they would be inclined to pass on these cost in-
creases to consumers, establishing a disincentive to engage
with environmentally friendly behaviour. Economic agents,
both as consumers and producers, therefore do not have
sufficient incentive on their own to internalize environ-
mental externalities. So, the link between saving the
environment and the implications it has for costs and prices
in the economic system, does not get reflected in the
manner that society and markets function, although its
existence may seem obvious.
The next complicating factor is brought in by the priorities
we have for a developing economy. We have multiple ob-
jectives that wewish to achieve for enhancing thewelfare of
the people, and development is all about enhancingwelfare.
If we do agree that it is important to protect the environment
through the use of economic mechanisms (or instruments),
the question arises as to where should we put them in our list
of priorities? In today’s world this has become an important
question because we have started seeing the consequences
of adopting development models that do not factor in the
environment. Environmental fiscal reform and environ-
mental fiscal instruments are attractive because they give us
hope that it is possible to prioritize the environment in the
economic planning process. Environmental fiscal reform can
do so in away that is (a) very visible; (b) which offers us away
of trying to rein in the most visible form of pollution which is
industrial pollution (that is the context inwhichmost EFR has
been developed); and, (c) that can generate revenues for
sustainable development. The environmental revenues
generated through taxes, user charges, and fees can be used
in ways that can meet non-environmental objectives such as
poverty alleviation. There are alternative ways in which the
idea of environmental prioritization can be made easier and
more acceptable to society.
I would like to give you two examples to illustrate what I
have been saying e concerning forests and e-waste. We all
love our forests, we see them as a visible natural resource
and we call them national capital in economics terminology.
We like to think that we have been able to preserve our
forests, and as our forest officials tell us, in aggregate we
have managed our forests reasonably well, over the last 30
years in particular. But there are many kinds of difficulties
within this e we have lost parts of our dense natural forest,
we have degraded our forests in many places; at the same
time we have succeeded with afforestation in other places. I
am trying to draw a parallel here in that there will be similar
problems with doing EFR; we are going to be successful in
certain sectors, with certain states, with certain legislations
and with certain institutions. This has been our experience
with most natural resources that we have tried to manage
over the years. This does not mean that the exercise is not
worth it. In India’s political economy, different states are at
different stages and it is natural to expect that EFR would be
more doable in certain sectors but that does not mean we
should not try out EFR as a means to protect our environ-
ment, and ensure a healthy future for the planet.
Here is another instance to think about. Where does the
electronic waste or e-waste, which is your mobile, your
laptop, your computer, all go? Most of your e-waste con-
tains traces of precious metals so there is a naturalincentive for e-waste to get into the informal sector. It also
contains extremely harmful elements that pollute our land
and water resources. The informal agents in the market will
tend to offer you something for it. We have recently passed
an electronic waste legislation in India which can help us
put in place EFRs. An EFR in this context can be as simple as
a refund on your hand set, which could change the way e-
waste is handled. I will leave you with that thought.
Ashish Chaturvedi: The next speaker Rita Pandey is a
professor at the National Institute of Public Finance and
Policy (NIPFP). She has done seminal work in the area of
environmental subsidies and taxation and has published
widely on the subject, including a co-authored book on eco-
taxes. She has recently come out with a report on the na-
tional energy fund, among other things.
Rita Pandey: I am going to start my presentation on a
positive note by saying that over the years EFR has gained
acceptance as a potentially powerful instrument in
addressing environmental pollution. EFR can help correct
false price signals within the economy through a range of
taxation and pricing measures that can free up economic
resources and/or generate revenues while helping to reach
environmental goals. Fig. 1 shows the different instruments
and approaches of EFR, both direct and indirect. There has
been good progress on EFR in many countries. However, the
pace at which different countries have moved has varied
across countries and also across various instruments.
After this very positive note, I am going to raise issues
that pertain to both design and implementation of EFR,
mainly in the context of India e I will then talk about the
progress made in the country, the opportunities around EFR
in India and finally end with observations on the framework
in which we should work if we really want to push EFR.
EFR: some issues
In discussing EFR instruments, the first instrument I will
discuss is environmental taxes and charges. This is a price
based instrument, a direct instrument, where the environ-
ment tax or charge is levied on the pollution generated. The
idea is to assign a price to environmental pollution. At NIPFP,
we have done a study in designing pollution charges for three
industriese distilleries, paper, and sugar. The main problem
that we faced was that of data gap which makes it very
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we have designed the second best instrument. I am not
suggesting that we do not have any information and that we
cannot make a start, but a lot more needs to be done; we
need more case studies to be able to convince policy makers
that the instrument could be given a try.
Second in the list is quantity based instruments such as
treatable pollution permits. One of the problems in this
area is the legal and institutional obstacles in India. Even
when these obstacles are overcome, we need to first set up
pilots and test them. At NIPFP we did a study for an inte-
grated steel plant and designed a model of intra-firm
trading and it was shown that this was a more cost effec-
tive way of addressing pollution vis-a-vis the present system
of command-and-control. This however is yet to reach a
pilot stage though there has been progress recently and a
three state study is under progress.
Environmental tax on inputs or outputs that are asso-
ciated with environmental damage can signal the costs of
negative externalities and thereby internalize these in de-
cision making by producers/consumers. This is a price
based instrument but second best. We are very close to
implementing goods and services tax (GST). But it is
important to integrate environmental concerns into GST, if
not it will have perverse environmental consequences.
Another issue is what should be the framework for sec-
toral policies? Should we work sector by sector or at the
city level, the state level or the country level? Also, there is
a gap in our understanding whether the energy policy goals
are in harmony with the fiscal policy which is supposed to
help achieve the energy policy goals. There is lack of reli-
able estimates of true tax burden on a given energy type.
The tax burden, disaggregated by generation, transmission,
and distribution, can provide information in analysing issues
in supply chain.
The other barrier that we have is the resistance by
vested interests and the difficulty in getting public support
when you are bringing in a new tax or when you are with-
drawing environmentally harmful subsidies (EHS). There is
also a lack of understanding of the linkages between the
existing subsidies and the underlying environmental re-
alities. So when we do not know what will happen when we
start a new subsidy or we reform an existing subsidy in
terms of its implications for the environment, then how can
we even convince the policy makers to go ahead and do the
reform? There is a need for informed debate on some of
these issues to help the government develop a strategy for
the reform of EHS. Various studies by the OECD have
developed tools to provide a framework for the identifica-
tion of EHS, to assess whether the subsidy removal will
benefit the environment, to help understand the wider
implications of subsidy reduction/removal, and a method-
ology such that these tools can be tested on selected case
studies. However, we need to do some case studies in the
context of India and understand how these methodologies
and tools which are available in the literature will play out.
EFR: progress in India
So far, in India, EFR has not received the kind of attention it
deserves from academics, policy makers, and otherstakeholders. Many of the conceptual, technical, and
operational issues are unresolved. Even the definition issue
of what is an EHS, not only in India but even in other
countries, is unresolved. The approach so far has been
piece-meal and the initiative and the drive so far has come
from the stakeholders outside the government, mainly from
the academics.
To give some examples of EFR in India e there is an
environmental cess on coal, which is a flat rate for ease of
administration; there is a differentiated excise structure to
incentivize fuel efficiency of automobiles. There has been
intense debate on higher excise duty of diesel vehicles and
on including petroleum products under the GST regimee
this is a good sign and shows how policy making happens.
Work on environmentally harmful subsidies has made slow
progress. Credible policy oriented research is sparse in
India. Further, the potential of user charges and fee which
is straightforward to design and implement has not been
exploited fully.
EFR: approach and framework
If we want to push EFR such that it translates to policy we
will need some preparatory work in the form of a broad
approach paper to get clarity on what should be the
framework’s direction and prioritization. Any sincere
attempt at addressing EFR should be in a programme mode
which has a link with Ministry of Finance or the Ministry of
Environment and Forests (MOEF) so that there is constant
dialogue and feedback. There is also a need to define what
the objectives of the EFR are, so that the policy objectives
and the design of the instruments are in harmony. We have
to be clear on what the target is. Are we targetting the
local environmental solution, resource efficiency, green-
house gases (GHG) or a combination of two or more of
these?
The broad approach to EFR could be a general umbrella
carbon tax of which there are several examples, the latest
being the carbon tax implemented in British Columbia in
Canada, with encouraging results on the impact on envi-
ronmental pollution. The framework could envisage a
resource tax or subsidy, it could be in a GST-type frame-
work or it could be a sectoral approach e industry by in-
dustry; it could consider state level interventions or a
sustainable cities framework where we consider trading
charges, subsidies, user charges, etc. This framework
would help in identifying the promising opportunities and
appropriate approaches for EFR in India.
Ashish Chaturvedi: Now, I will call upon our final
speaker, Professor Kavi Kumar of the Madras School of
Economics, one of leading lights of the environmental
economics scenario in India. Professor Kumar has done
seminal work on the impact of fiscal instruments in envi-
ronmental management in the Indian context and has also
explored the possibilities of integrating eco-taxes in a GST
regime.
Kavi Kumar: I will take over from where Prof Rita Pan-
dey left off and provide a few more clarifications on tax and
fiscal reform and instruments before moving on to other
things. There are multiple terms being used in the litera-
ture e with expanding scope of intervention there is
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fiscal reform, green tax and budgetary reform (GTBR), and
so on. Broadly, one could say that tax reforms are exclu-
sively trying to get tax issues in place; fiscal reforms can go
beyond tax and also look at subsidy issues, whereas the
green tax and budgetary reforms go beyond the environ-
mental objectives and try and target poverty alleviation
and so on. So we have a wide gamut of terminology in the
literature. The international experience shows that the
reforms are environmentally effective and are not likely to
hurt growth.
I would like next to clarify a few issues and share a few
experiences from the work that we are doing at the Madras
School of Economics, where incidentally I co-ordinate the
activities of the Centre of Excellence in Environmental
Technology which works in close co-ordination with the
Ministry of Environment, Government of India on policy
formulation and other matters. Environmental fiscal re-
forms, whether we call them tax reforms, GTBR or EFRs,
are most often reflected through instruments such as car-
bon taxes e it is not that they are targetting global pol-
lutants like CO2, they are intended to target much more
effectively the local pollutants like particulate matter and
sulphur dioxide, and so on. But it is easier to understand the
effectiveness of your intervention through the impact on
global pollution index. That’s why we often see that the
effectiveness of reforms is measured through the global
pollution index. We also have certain other issues such as
whether we should be targetting pollution per se or
polluting inputs and outputs.
International experience of EFR
With regard to the international experience of EFR, let me
first discuss the EU (European Union) experiences which
have been in the forefront of EFR. In trying to achieve
environment fiscal reforms, they are not necessarily tar-
getting pollution per se, they have also used environmen-
tally polluting inputs and outputs as an interventional
mechanism. In the EU, indirect tax reforms have resulted in
greenhouse gas reduction to a tune of around 6% over the
past two decades. Several countries have tried in different
ways but effectiveness need not be measured through the
environmental perspective alone. You can also measure
effectiveness through the cost of these reforms in terms of
economic output, the loss in GDP, the impact on employ-
ment, the impact on poverty alleviation and so on. Many of
the EU studies have tried to measure those things as well e
so they have tried to achieve multiple objectives. Thus,
when one looks at the role played by the reforms in
reducing the environmental burden, the evidence does
show that they have had a reasonable effect.
Environmental taxes e India
With regard to national experience, a recent World Bank
study (Mani, Markandya, Sagar, & Sahin, 2012) used a
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to assess im-
plications of different instruments such as coal tax and
particulate matter (PM) tax on local and global emissions
and the economic growth. The study concluded that a taxon particulate matter (i.e., direct tax on the pollution) is
going to be more effective. However, given the practical
difficulties associated with the measurement of particulate
matter, or other types of pollution, the feasibility of
implementing PM tax is unclear. In this context it is
important to understand the way environmental legislation
works in India. In India, environmental laws are criminal
laws e one has either polluted or not polluted; it is a zero-
one situation. The criminal laws, unlike the civil laws, do
not provide scope for examining the extent of pollution
emitted by different polluters. With criminal laws govern-
ing pollution, the scope for using economic instruments
directly for pollution control reduces. As an alternative,
one can target polluting inputs and outputs to control
pollution. Using economic instruments, such as tax on
polluting inputs and outputs, has no legal obstacles. Though
such an option could only be considered as second best
compared to taxing pollution directly, one may still explore
the option to manage the environment.
At the Madras School of Economics we have thought of
various ways in which indirect intervention could be done in
taxing the polluting inputs and outputs, like, for instance,
taxing coal. An example of taxing the output could be, for
instance, taxing batteries. Once batteries are used up what
do you do with them? There is some price to be paid in
disposing them of, which could be built into the product
pricing. We have argued effectively with the various policy
making bodies and eventually that resulted in the 2010
budget accord coal cess of Rs. 50 per ton. We prescribed a
cess proportional to the ash content but eventually, for
administrative purposes, a uniform cess of Rs. 50 per ton of
coal was proposed and implemented. The regulation be-
comes complicated once India moves into the GST regime
which is under consideration right now. Once you enter into
the GST regime the relatively higher tax that you have built
up on the polluting inputs and outputs gets negated
because you are entering into a uniform tax regime. Our
argument has been that when we are debating on the GST
issues and designing the tax, we should also try and inte-
grate eco-taxes into the system. One way to do that is to
think of an additional cess or excise on identified polluting
goods and services. The list of polluting goods and services
should not be very exhaustive to ensure that the main
objective of GST in streamlining the indirect taxes is not
jeopardized. Thus, for environmental considerations, we
must try and identify a set of most polluting inputs and
outputs that could be separately taxed through additional
cess, over and above the GST. This should not be rebated
along the value chain. As this debate is going on at the
national level, we have also started discussing the issues at
the state level as to bring on board the perspectives of the
state-level stakeholders.
Environmental implications of growth e Tamil Nadu
We have taken up a study with the Tamil Nadu government,
with support from other organizations, to look at the po-
tential interventions in terms of environmental fiscal re-
forms in Tamil Nadu to understand what can be done at the
state level. Tamil Nadu is one of the most heavily indus-
trialized states with high CO2 per capita emissions. As the
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sector as part of its Vision 2023, the burden on the envi-
ronment is likely to intensify. We have identified several
sectors with high pollution potential (cement, transport,
energy, buildings) and have proposed instruments to con-
trol the pollution. The instruments are designed as two-part
instruments: the first part being a tax and the second part
being a subsidy. This strategy aims to address several as-
pects simultaneously including maximization of environ-
mental impact, financing the subsidy, internalizing the
administrative costs, and minimizing the revenue risks for
the state government.
We are trying to look at instruments of two broad groups.
In the Indian federal context, environmental taxes can be
divided into two groups. The first, Group-A, consisting of
state taxes where the relevant central provisions may have
to be taken into account; the state governmentmay not be in
a position to implement the instrument on its owne it has to
have the concurrence of the central government. The sec-
ond, Group-B, where the fiscal instrument can be decided by
the state government; the state government could imple-
ment the instruments on its own or could also leave it to the
judgement of the local governments. In the context of the
instruments under Group-A, account also has to be taken of
the present transitional position where efforts are being
made to move to a comprehensive GST from the present
system of domestic indirect taxes consisting of CenVAT,
StateVAT and service tax (See Table 1 for summary of sug-
gested fiscal instruments).
As far as Group A is concerned, Tamil Nadu can consider
uplifting the State VAT rate on goods such as coal, iron and
steel etc. For instance, in case of coal, the tax (at 5% rate)
is rebated at later stages of its usage with the good falling
under the list of declared goods under CST Act. However,
following the initiatives already undertaken in states such
as Orissa, the Tamil Nadu government may also limit or
disallow the rebate of input tax paid on coal at later stages
of value addition to facilitate more considerate consump-
tion of this polluting input.Table 1 Fiscal Instruments e Summary.
Instrument Counterpart
Group A
Uplifting to higher State VAT rates
of identified polluting goods
Applying lower St
to environment p
Alternate under GST
Non-rebatable excise/cess on
identified polluting goods
Placing under exe
identified environ
promoting goods
Group B
Cess on electricity duty for
generation of electricity using
polluting inputs (coal)
Subsidy to electri
using non-conven
Congestion tax on traffic in
identified cities (city-centres;
specified hours)
Inner city road de
Property tax concession on green
commercial buildings
Property tax cess
commercial build
Green motor vehicle tax Augmenting finan
and maintenanceIn Group B, the focus is on goods that can be handled by
the state without requiring central government concur-
rence. Following the example set by Gujarat, Tamil Nadu can
consider a green cess on electricity generated from non-
renewable resources such as coal. Gujarat has managed to
impose 2 paise per kilowatt-hour cess on electricity gener-
ated from all non-renewable sources. With the provisions
given under clause 3 of the Electricity Act 2003, the state
government can levy such a cess.Wehave demonstrated that
such cess will be highly effective in controlling carbon
emissions in Tamil Nadu. The other taxes proposed include
congestion tax by local governments in select municipal
corporations where vehicle density is high, reduced VAT on
vehicles using alternate fuels like LPG and hybrid fuels, and
revised green tax on older vehicles on lines similar to those
practised in states such as Andhra Pradesh and Himachal
Pradesh. The study also proposed a range of interventions in
the construction section including reduced VAT on installa-
tion of energy saving materials, rebate on property tax for
buildings using energy saving materials etc.
The effectiveness of some of these proposals has been
assessed over the period 2012e13 to 2030e31 (see Table 2).
It is argued for instance that a green cess of 2 paise per
kilowatt-hour on electricity generated from hydro-carbon
based fuels would result in greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sion reduction of about 125 million tons (CO2 equivalent)
and achieve GHG reduction at Rs. 0.14 per ton of CO2
equivalent. It should be noted that the instruments pro-
posed in the study have been identified through a series of
consultations with state government officials, industry, and
other stakeholders.
Ashish Chaturvedi: Thank you. If you look at the logic of
this session, we started with a broad look at EFR and its
potential and then proceeded to details, specific issues,
examples and policy prescription. We are now open to
questions from the floor.
Q: My question is to Rita Pandey. In Punjab, we are
looking to find ways to generate revenues as also reduce
subsidies. But there is a major problem with reduction inImplemented by
ate VAT rates
romoting goods
State government
(under State VAT regime)
mpt category
ment
and services
State government
(under GST Regime)
city producers
tional inputs
State government
velopment fund Local government
on conventional
ings
Local government
cing of road building
using green materials
State government
Table 2 Effectiveness of selected fiscal instruments.
Instrument NPV of net benefits
(Rs. crore)
GHG emission reduction
(Million tons CO2 equivalent)
Cost effectiveness
(Rs/ton CO2 equivalent)
Green cess 11,206 146.1 0.14
Coal cess 9821 125.6 0.16
Rebate on property tax for green buildings 791 26.2 0.03
Estimates are over the period 2012e13 to 2030e31.
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Punjab and the subsidies are leading to environmental
degradation to a large extent. With the power subsidy there
is an overuse of ground water; similarly pesticides and
fertilizers are being subsidized, and are also being overused
and therefore they are polluting the soil. Therefore, we
need to 1) protect the environment; 2) generate revenue;
and 3) reduce subsidies. How do we protect the environ-
ment as well as generate revenue?
Rita Pandey: Good question. First thing I would like to
say is that EFR is there to address environmental issues. The
first objective is not to raise revenue; when you implement
EFR, initially you could be raising revenue and later it would
taper off. That is the sign that you are able to influence
behaviour. Next is the issue of designing instruments for
specific issues and how to reform subsidies which have a
harmful effect on environment. I have done some work on
environmentally harmful subsidies and a project that
included a case study on agriculture e we looked at pes-
ticides and fertilizers. Fertilizer and pesticide subsidy is a
complex issue. These subsidies have economic, social, and
environmental impacts. The challenge is to find the levels
at which these subsidies become environmentally perverse.
So here you either have to have dual pricing or the
approach has to be very targetted.
Kavi Kumar: I agree with Rita Pandey about prioritizing.
You are not trying to necessarily raise revenue; incidentally
or by the way it will also raise revenue. So the three ob-
jectives that you mentioned will actually become two ob-
jectives e environmental subsidies should be reduced and
the revenues to finance need not necessarily come from
taxes in the agriculture sector.
Ashish Chaturvedi: I just wanted to add a few closing
comments on the feasibility and spread of taxes. We should
start thinking along the lines of product based taxation. If
you link taxes to income the issue becomes complicated,
but when you consider that the number of people who
consume crisps or bottled aerated drinks are far more than
the number of people who pay taxes, then making products
our basis makes our base much larger.
Another question that needs to be asked is why isn’t
there a depository refund for PET bottles? It seems such a
simple and obvious thing. Our municipalities and local
governments deal with all kinds of waste management
problems but these are very basic instruments. Companies
like Coke and Pepsi are willing to do it and they are doing it
everywhere else in the world so why can’t we do something
like that in a country like India?
Rita Pandey: EFR is new and has been limited so far both in
spread and scale. Successful implementation of EFR wouldneed concerted efforts in designing appropriate instruments,
awareness and capacity building of stakeholders, bringing in
supporting legislation and institutions which will complement
EFR and help improve their efficiency.
Ashish Chaturvedi: On that note, on behalf of the
Centre for Public Policy, IIM Bangalore, thank you very
much for your contribution to today’s discussion.
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